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Over the last decade, relocation has become one of the most litigated and researched areas of 
family law in the common law world. This article has a simple, and limited aim – to commence 
a conversation about how Irish courts ought to approach relocation disputes in light of recent 
constitutional and legislative developments, while drawing on the experience of jurisdictions 
with broadly similar legal frameworks. To this end, it will look at the development of relocation 
principles in the English courts, and then at the relocation judgments handed down by the Irish 
courts, decisions which have often relied heavily on English case law. It will then attempt to 
fill a gap in the current Irish literature by examining current trends in relocation law 
internationally, both in terms of judicial approaches to the problem and, crucially, the debates 
about exactly how courts should approach the application of the best interests principle in a 
way that addresses the peculiarities of a relocation dispute.  
What emerges from the literature and case law is that a pure best interests approach based on 
legislative statements of broad factors to be considered is insufficient in relocation disputes. A 
form of structured guidance, including an indication of relative weighting of these factors, 
which falls short of the use of strong presumptions is best suited to handling this particular kind 
of case. It will conclude that the Irish courts need to find a way of providing guidance as to 
how to implement s.31 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964. Simply considering various 
factual circumstances found in a case against statutory criteria would run contrary to the 
emerging international preference for weighting guidelines, and may lead to courts failing to 
fulfil the overarching constitutional duty to ensure that the best interests of the child really are 
the paramount consideration. 
Relocation in England and Wales  
One of the earliest relocation decisions was Poel v Poel,1 where it was held that welfare was to 
be the primary factor which should influence a court, but that there was a significant amount 
                                                          
1 [1970] 1 WLR 1469. 
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of discretion afforded to the parent having custody of the child. The issue was revisited in 
several cases,2 and the Children Act 1989 brought about a reorientation of the law relating to 
the exercise of parental responsibility so that welfare was to be the paramount consideration, 
and in effect, the only consideration.3 However, it came to be felt that if a proposal by a child’s 
primary carer to relocate was reasonable, the application would likely be successful.  
The decision in Payne v Payne restated the relevant principles, and became a seminal decision 
for relocation cases globally.4 Two significant judgments were given; the first by Thorpe LJ, 
the second by Butler-Sloss P. In respect of the former, Thorpe LJ made clear that the only 
applicable legal principle in relocation cases was the welfare of the child. He saw fit, however, 
to provide the following guidance, now known as the “discipline”, on how the welfare of the 
child could be determined: 
(a) Pose the question: is the mother's application genuine in the sense that it is 
not motivated by some selfish desire to exclude the father from the child's life. 
Then ask is the mother's application realistic, by which I mean founded on 
practical proposals both well researched and investigated? If the application 
fails either of these tests refusal will inevitably follow. 
(b) If however the application passes these tests then there must be a careful 
appraisal of the father's opposition: is it motivated by genuine concern for the 
future of the child's welfare or is it driven by some ulterior motive? What would 
be the extent of the detriment to him and his future relationship with the child 
were the application granted? To what extent would that be offset by extension 
of the child's relationships with the maternal family and homeland? 
(c) What would be the impact on the mother, either as the single parent or as a 
new wife, of a refusal of her realistic proposal? [Where the mother cares for the 
child or proposes to care for the child within a new family, the impact of the 
refusal on the new family and on the stepfather or prospective stepfather must 
also be carefully calculated.5] 
(d) The outcome of the second and third appraisals must then be brought into 
an overriding review of the child's welfare as the paramount consideration, 
directed by the statutory checklist insofar as appropriate. 
In suggesting such a discipline I would not wish to be thought to have diminished the 
importance that this court has consistently attached to the emotional and psychological 
                                                          
2 Chamberlain v De La Mare [1983] 4 FLR 434, Belton v Belton [1987] 2 FLR 343, Re F (A Ward) (Leave to 
Remove Ward Out of Jurisdiction) [1987] 2 FLR 116. 
3 See generally, Rob George Relocation Disputes: Law and Practice in England and New Zealand (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2014) ch 2; Rachel Taylor, “Poels Apart: Fixed Principles and Shifting Values in Relocation Law” in 
Stephen Gilmore, Jonathan Herring and Rebecca Probert, Landmark Cases in Family Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011).  
4 [2001] EWCA Civ 166, [2001] 1 FLR 1052. 
5 This sentence was added by Thorpe LJ in Re B (Removal from the Jursdiction); Re S (Removal from the 
Jurisdiction) [2003] EWCA Civ 1149, [11]. 
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well-being of the primary carer. In any evaluation of the welfare of the child as the 
paramount consideration great weight must be given to this factor.6 
It has been thought that this decision effectively prioritises the interests of the applicant for 
relocation, to the extent that a judge who pays insufficient attention to the impact on the 
applicant of a refusal is making a serious error.7 However, the correct approach is to consider 
the impact of a denial of the application as one factor to be assessed and weighed while 
undertaking a welfare analysis – if there will be a significant detrimental effect on the applicant, 
this is an important factor in determining the child’s welfare.8 Thorpe LJ’s judgment came to 
dominate relocation litigation for over a decade. 
The judgment of Butler-Sloss P is somewhat broader. She stated that the welfare of the child 
is always paramount, there is no presumption in favour of the applicant parent, and that the 
“reasonable proposals of the parent with a residence order wishing to live abroad carry great 
weight.”9 Courts also need to scrutinise the proposals and motivation behind the intended 
move, the effect on the applicant of a refusal, and the impact on contact with the left behind 
parent.10 Butler-Sloss P’s decision also seemingly introduced a crucial distinction into 
relocation law – the distinction between those cases where there is a primary carer and a parent 
with contact, and those cases where care is shared between the parents.11 Later case also sought 
to introduce other categories based on the applicant’s primary reason for moving - “going 
home” cases, “specific opportunity” cases, “new partner” cases, “lifestyle” cases and “get 
away”.12  
However, the scope and application of Payne became the subject of much dispute and courts 
began to resile from placing such a heavy emphasis on Payne, and the discipline in particular, 
in both K v K,13 and the 2012 decision of Re F.14 Further, these decisions also sought to move 
                                                          
6 Payne [40]-[41].  
7 Mary Hayes, “Relocation Cases: Is the Court of Appeal Applying the Correct Principles?” (2006) 18 Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 351. 
8 See Re AR (A Child: Relocation) [2010] EWHC 1346 (Fam), [2010] 2 FLR 1577; J v S (Leave to Remove) [2010] 
EWHC 2098 (Fam), [2011] 1 FLR 1694. 
9 Payne [85]-[86]. 
10 Ibid. It has been stated that it is this, rather than Thorpe LJ’s decision, which provides the “best summary of the 
approach which judges are required to take to these difficult decisions” – Re D (Leave to Remove: Appeal [2010] 
EWCA Civ 50, [2010] 2 FLR 1605, [18]. 
11 On the question of alternatives to the Payne guidance, see Rob George, Damian Garrido, Francis Judge, Anna 
Worwood, Relocation: A Practical Guide (Bristol: Jordan’s Family Law, 2013) 20-26. 
12 Ibid, 4-5. 
13 K v K (Children: Permanent Removal from Jurisdiction) [2011] EWCA Civ 793, [2012] Fam 134. 
14 Re F (A Child) (Relocation) [2012] EWCA Civ 1364, [2013] 1 FLR 645. 
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away from the attempts at case classifications. 15 The judgments in K v K and Re F state that 
“‘the only principle to be extracted from Payne v Payne is the paramountcy principle. All the 
rest … is guidance as to factors to be weighed in search of the welfare paramountcy.”16 The 
law on relocation was comprehensively restated in the 2015 Court of Appeal decision of Re 
F.17 This followed the approach of the more recent case law by emphasising that the central 
function for the court was a holistic evaluation of the child’s welfare. The over-reliance on the 
Payne discipline was heavily criticised, stating that such reliance would likely lead a court into 
error.18 With respect to how the court ought to undertake the task of evaluating the competing 
proposals made by parents, it was stated that it was necessary to do so  
in the light of, inter alia, the welfare check list … and having regard to the interests of 
the parties, and most important of all, of the child. Such consideration needs to be 
directed at each of the proposals taken as a whole. The court also needs to compare the 
rival proposals against each other since a proposal, or a feature of a proposal, which 
may seem inappropriate, looked at on its own, may take on a different complexion when 
weighed against the alternative; and vice versa.19 
 
Relocation in Ireland 
There is, at present, a limited amount of case law on relocation from Ireland, although 
increasing attention is being paid to the issue.20 The proper statutory basis for a relocation 
application under s.11 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, which gives the courts a wide 
discretion to make orders in relation to custody and access. Ireland has recently enacted its own 
version of a statutory welfare checklist, found in s.31 of the 1964 Act.21 This obliges a court to 
consider a range of factors; among the most relevant to relocation disputes are the benefit to 
the child of having a meaningful relationship with each of his or her parents and with the other 
relatives and persons who are involved in the child’s upbringing, and the need to have sufficient 
contact with them to maintain such relationships.22 The willingness and ability of each of the 
                                                          
15 See K v K [86], [87], [144], Re F, ibid, and Rob George, “International Relocation, Care Arrangements and 
Case Taxonomy” [2012] Family Law 1478. 
16 K v K, [39] per Thorpe LJ, and see also Munby LJ in Re F [37] and [61]. 
17 Re F (A Child) (International Relocation Cases) [2015] EWCA Civ 882. 
18 Ibid, [27] 
19 Ibid, [43]. 
20 See Geoffrey Shannon, Sixth Report of the Special Rapporteur on Child Protection (Government Publications 
2013) 151-162; Ghislaine Lanteigne, “Parenting arrangements and relocation law in England and Wales, and 
Canada: In search of better rules and guidelines” [2014] 4(1) Irish Journal of Legal Studies 39 
21 Inserted by s.63 of the Children and Family Relationships Act 2015. This came into effect on 18 January 2016 





child’s parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child 
and the other parent and relatives is also a factor that must be considered.23 The physical, 
psychological and emotional needs of the child, and the likely effect on him or her of any 
change of circumstances must be considered,24 as must the history of the child’s upbringing 
and care.25 Any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering, including harm as 
a result of household violence, must be taken into account, incorporating the protection of the 
child’s safety and psychological well-being.26 Courts must also consider the views of the child 
concerned.27 Section 31(4) further indicates that “a parent’s conduct may be considered to the 
extent that it is relevant to the child’s welfare and best interests only”. Prior to the enactment 
of this section however, the 1964 Act provided much more limited guidance, stating merely 
that welfare was the first and paramount consideration,28 with welfare being defined as 
comprising the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social welfare of the child.29 
Application of the new s.31 cheklist therefore involves a more comprehensive assessment of 
the child’s welfare, but it remains to be seen how this will be implemented. 
What little relocation case law has been reported was mostly considered under the auspices of 
the older statutory regime. In EM v AM,30 the father was the child’s sole custodian, and the 
mother sought to relocate with the child to the United States to be near her family. Flood J 
outlined that the welfare of the child had to be the first and paramount consideration, and then 
went on to state that “the task of the Court is to decide … which of the two [parents], in all the 
prevailing circumstances, is the more appropriate to have custody by virtue of the fact that joint 
custody has proved unworkable.”31 As a result, he regarded the relocation application as a 
trigger for a more far-reaching assessment of how to promote the child’s welfare. In 
undertaking this exercise, regard had to be had to six factors: 
(1) Which of the two [hypothetical outcomes] will provide the greater stability of 
lifestyle for [the child]; 
(2) The contribution to such stability that will be provided by the environment in which 
[the child] will reside, with particular regard to the influence of his extended family; 
(3) The professional advice tendered [by an expert witness]; 
(4) The capacity for, and frequency of, access by the non-custodial parent; 






28 Section 3 of the 1964 Act. 
29 Section 2 of the 1964 Act. 
30 HC, 16 June 1992. 
31 Ibid, 7. 
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(5) The past record of each parent, in their relationship with [the child] insofar as it 
impinges on the welfare of [the child]; 
(6) The respect, in terms of the future, of the parties, to orders and directions of this 
Court.32 
 
The decision in EM is rather unusual, in that it was the non-custodial parent who sought to 
relocate with the child. The non-custodial parent was allowed to relocate with the child, which 
led a later court to state that EM in no way creates any form of presumption in favour of the 
custodial parent.33 
In KB v LO’R,34 Murphy J made the rather curious statement that “the welfare of the children 
and of their mother, who have constituted a unit since 2003 is of paramount importance.”35 
This went some distance beyond the Payne disciple which attached significant weight to the 
relocating parent’s interests by regarding the relocating parent and the child as a family unit 
whose interests could not be severed. This would logically go some way to creating a 
presumption in favour of the custodial parent, whether they were the relocating parent or not – 
Poel and Payne were discussed in such a way as to indicate that these cases went some way to 
introducing a presumption in favour of the primary carer. Such an approach, however, arguably 
ran contrary to both the constitutional right of the child to have its welfare regarded as the first 
and paramount consideration under Art 40.3° and the 1964 Act.  
A more comprehensive restatement of the Irish position on relocation was undertaken by in UV 
v VU.36 MacMenamin J expressly disavowed the notion that presumptions played any role in 
English relocation law, while acknowledging that there had been some inclination towards such 
a position.37 MacMenamin J did cite Butler-Sloss P’s judgement in Payne with approval, and 
then proceeded to place some significant weight on the protection of [the child’s] rights to 
access or contact with each parent, where practicable, and appropriate, having regard to their 
welfare.38 This was indeed seen as a necessary under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
which “must be read in such a manner so as to respect the obligation to take into consideration 
the child’s best interest, and the fundamental right of the child to “maintain on a regular basis 
                                                          
32 Ibid, 7-8.  
33 See comments of MacMenanin J in UV v VU [2011] IEHC 519, [20]. 
34 [2009] IEHC 247. 
35 Ibid, [8]. 
36 [2011] IEHC 519. 
37 Ibid [28]-[30]. 
38 Ibid, [43] emphasis in original.  
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personal relationships and direct contact with both of his or her parents, stated in Article 
24(3)”.39  
MacMenamin J highlighted that the rights established by the Constitution must be used as the 
guiding principles in relocation disputes. He restated that Article 40.3 contains the right of the 
child to have decisions in relation to guardianship and custody taken in the interests of his or 
her welfare,40 and that under Art 42, any action by the state to further a child’s welfare must 
also have due regard for the natural and imprescriptible rights of the child including the right 
to be educated by the family and to be provided by its parents with religious, moral, intellectual, 
physical and social education. With specific reference to the relevance of the Constitution to 
relocation disputes, MacMenamin J held that “the issue is the identification of the balance of 
rights between the individual parents who are in contention, and the rights of the children. In 
such a situation the rights of the children are, as a matter of constitutional law, to be the 
paramount consideration.”41 Relating this constitutional principle to the discussion surrounding 
Payne, he stated that  
very great weight should be attached to the views of the custodial parent, but there can 
be no actual presumption that the views of that parent should hold sway with a court. 
The children’s welfare is paramount. A fortiori, this observation applies in 
circumstances where (as here) the parents have joint custody. This is very far from 
determining that the children’s welfare is the only consideration. However, the rights 
of all parties must be weighed in accordance with the fact that the welfare principle is 
the overarching one. But a presumption raises issues of equality. All citizens are entitled 
to equal status before the law.42 
 
Later in the judgment, MacMenamin J considered a variety of factors, including the stability 
of the current arrangements, the findings of expert evidence, the mother’s motivation for 
relocation, the feasibility of her plans, the feasibility of maintaining a meaningful contact with 
the father, the relationship between the parents and the father’s conduct to date, the children’s 
views, and the potential impact of relocation, or its refusal, on each parent.43 These factors were 
not listed as issues that had to be considered as a matter of law, but rather as evidential issues 
going to the determination of where the children’s welfare lay. So far as legal principles can be 
extracted from the case, it eschews the idea that presumptions can play any part in the law, and 
                                                          
39 Ibid [41], citing Case C-400/10 PPU JMcB v LE [2010] ECR I-8965. 
40 FN v CO [2004] 4 IR 311. 
41 UV v VU (above) [17]. 
42 Ibid, [18]. Emphasis in original.  
43 Ibid, [47] - [88]. 
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while recognising the that views of  relocating parent should be attached some significant 
weight, the determining factor will always be the child’s welfare. This would seem to indicate 
the Irish approach has been to adopt an open-ended best interests test with some significant 
weight attached to the maintenance of close relationships with both parents, and to the views 
of the custodian parent, a position which could, in some cases, come close to contradiction. 
The decision in UV was interpreted by Abbot J in G v K as meaning that “in the Irish context 
any presumptions or quasi presumptions in relation to movement were not consistent in many 
cases with the best interests of the child, or with the specific dictates of the Guardianship of 
Infants 1964, as amended, and the Irish Constitution in relation to the paramountcy of the 
interests of the child”.44 Presumptions, therefore, were not seen as unconstitutional per se, but 
inconsistent with the underlying constitutional and statutory principles steering the courts 
towards a more open-ended approach to welfare.  
A further attempt at providing a list of “important balancing factors” was undertaken in SP v 
JE.45 White J considered a relocation application where the mother sought to relocate to 
England permanently, having moved between England and Ireland over several years. He 
quoted extensively from the UV decision, before going on to summarise what he regarded as 
the “important balancing factors”: 
(i) The present welfare of the child; 
(ii) The possible disruption to the child if relocation is not granted and the 
impact on his welfare; 
(iii) The impact on the access rights of the respondent if relocation is granted; and 
(iv) [Whether] contact be maintained with the non custodial parent if relocation is 
granted?46 
Reviewing the evidence, he highlighted the presence of the mother’s extended family in 
England, the tenuous nature of her housing and employment prospects in Ireland, and the 
feasibility of access arrangements to be relevant indicators of these four criteria. As a result, 
the relocation was permitted, with significant access arranged which was to take place in each 
jurisdiction. This places no emphasis whatever on the child’s views, the feasibility of the 
proposed move, or the reason for the proposed relocation, all of which were considered to be 
important evidential matters in UV.  
 
                                                          
44 [2013] IEHC 650, [30], emphasis added. 
45 [2013] IEHC 634 
46 Ibid, [31]. 
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One point of crucial significance emerged from the decision of RL v Judge Heneghan.47 In the 
older case of EM v AM, Flood J used the relocation application as an opportunity to revisit the 
primary question of custody. However, in RL it was held that in relocation applications, the 
courts are not empowered to undertake a wide-ranging review of the child’s situation which 
may lead to the making of orders transferring custody from one parent to another, if that is 
outside the scope of the proceedings. At the conclusion of the Circuit Court appeal proceedings 
in which a custodial mother seeking to relocate, Judge Heneghan refused the mother’s 
application and also made the father the child’s primary carer, overturning the pre-existing 
relationship. The Court of Appeal was clear that, even though s.11 1964 Act is widely drafted, 
the Circuit Court was exercising its appellate jurisdiction, and the powers of the court are 
limited by the nature of the initial application.48 In the present case, the father had not sought 
custody of the child, and as such a custody application was not before the court, and so the 
order granting him custody was quashed. This clarifies that s.11 does not grant a free-standing 
jurisdiction to undertake a full welfare review. A non-custodial parent may continue, as in EM, 
to apply for relocation, but the section does not allow the court to grant orders not sought in 
the pleadings under its own motion. 
 
Only one relocation judgment has been reported since the coming into effect of the Children 
and Family Relationships Act 2015. All Irish cases discussed so far were international 
relocations. The decision of HOR v MR concerned an internal location, where permission was 
sought for a child to move from a city to a town in the outer reaches of that city’s commuter 
belt, approximately 85 kilometres away.49 After the parents’ separation, the mother purchased 
a home in the town in question, and the child began schooling there. The father was aware of 
this and cooperated with the move. A series of court applications followed, as a result of which 
the mother and child again took up residence in the city, while the mother retained her other 
property. She was granted permission by the Circuit Court to relocate to that town permanently, 
but the father appealed to the High Court.  
 
Abbott J had to consider the factors outlined in s.31, and in doing so made several comments 
that will require further clarification in later case law. First, he seemed to indicate that the 
“meaningful relationship” considered in s.31(1)(a) would mean that “…the relationship should 
                                                          
47 [2015] IECA 120. 
48 Ibid, [15]-[27] 
49 [2016] IEHC 781. 
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not be trivial, but earnest and sincere”.50 Further, the obligation on the courts is to “…continue 
to strive for the barest minimum relationship by contact through letter, phone or some other 
basic route, so that the potential for improvement of contact is preserved, and that total loss of 
contact, with all the disastrous psychological consequences, is avoided.”51 This will, he posits, 
in many cases result in the court attempting to salvage some form of contact while, in cases 
such as the present, the focus should be on attempting to optimise the relationship. With respect 
to the understanding of the term “relatives and other persons who are involved in the child’s 
upbringing”, contemplated by both s.31(1)(a) and s.31(1)(d), Abbott J drew a distinction 
between those relatives who were fully involved in providing for a child’s upbringing, and 
those who form part of the child’s “social capital.”52 Relatives who form part of the latter group 
“…may have a more intense involvement during emergencies in the event of mother being 
away and when assistance may be required with school, but the activities of such persons are 
random and casual and should not be taken” as meaning that they are involved in child’s 
upbringing.53 The understanding of these terms is crucial to any parenting dispute, and it is 
unfortunate that little clear information is presented in the judgment as to precisely what the 
access arrangements were as between the parents so as to help us understand exactly how the 
relocation would have impacted on what the court considered to be an already meaningful 
relationship between father and child. Further, there is no real detail on the nature of the 
relationship between the child and the extended family members. The distinction between 
“social capital” relatives and “upbringing” relatives is a welcome one, but one that will 
inevitably be context sensitive, and so some further clarity is needed on this point. 
 
The judgment does contain some highly concerning statements relating to relocation law 
however. The mother was seeking permission to relocate to her own home where she had 
previously lived with the child with the knowledge and cooperation of the father. Nonetheless, 
Abbott J saw her initial move as an undesirable pre-emption of the decision making power of 
the court.54 This is a very problematic statement. No proceedings were in being at the time of 
the initial move, and it is not evident from the judgment that there was an indication that 
proceedings were likely; this was not a unilateral or surreptitious move designed to interfere 
with the relationship between father and child, but one that the child’s primary carer firmly 
                                                          
50 Ibid, [7]. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, [11]. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid, [21]. 
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believed to be in the child’s interest and which was carried out in conjunction with the father. 
To characterise a consensual relocation in such negative terms can only have a chilling effect 
on such moves which may be in a child’s interests. He further characterised the purchase of the 
property as a constraining factor on his application of s.31 criteria, which indicates that what 
happens prior to an application being brought may be regarded as a fait accompli. This would 
be especially concerning if the action in question were one which was manifestly negative for 
the child’s interests. 
 
An even more troubling view is the one expressed by Abbott J that if the mother had sought a 
court order to approve her initial relocation, it  
… in all likelihood would not have been approved by the court as it would have been 
viewed at that stage as not being in the interest of the child O or father insofar as it 
placed the obvious strain on access arrangements and cut off options that would be 
preserved for the child if both parents were remaining in the city close to their 
employment.55  
This is an extremely concerning statement. Nowhere does the Constitution or the legislation 
permit the court to consider the best interests of a parent in any proceedings relating to children. 
It is the child’s best interests alone which can determine the outcome of such proceedings. Even 
taking this statement to mean that a relocation application would have been premature, it must 
be asked at what point an application would be appropriate? Many relocations take place 
shortly after parental separation,56 and there seems to be no clear basis for determining that an 
application has been made too soon. Implicitly, it seems from Abbott J’s statement that the best 
interests test demands that options be kept open or be given a chance to work before relocation 
becomes an option. Yet all options regarding access and other matters can be considered in the 
context of a relocation action. Following the approach of the English Court of Appeal in Re F, 
a holistic assessment of all the options can be entered into when a relocation is sought;57 there 
is no need to “wait and see”. It reads almost as if there is a presumption against early relocation. 
 
Clearly, s.31 is going to place new demands on courts and will impact on the way in which 
relocation applications are approached. No case law was cited in the HOR judgment, so it can 
be assumed the Abbott J’s decision sought to resolve a very particular problem. However, 
relocation cases will continue to present difficulties for courts, parents, and children. The new 
                                                          
55 Ibid, [16], emphasis added. 
56 Rollie Thompson, “Presumptions, Burdens, and Best Interests in Relocation Law” (2015) 53(1) Family Court 
Review 40, 44. 
57 Re F [2015], above. 
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statutory guidelines on the meaning of best interests are an extremely welcome and long 
overdue reform, but how are such checklists applied internationally? It is to this question that 
we must now turn. 
 
Examining the current state of relocation law internationally 
Relocation Law in New Zealand 
The law in New Zealand was underpinned the Poel decision until the 1995 case of Stadniczenko 
v Stadniczenko.58 The New Zealand Court of Appeal held that where a child lives is usually a 
matter for the custodial parent, and that the child’s best interests should determine any dispute, 
but that the rights of both parents also had to be considered as they could impact on the welfare 
assessment. All the factors had to be weighed, without any “preconceived notion” as to the 
weight to attach to each factor. The nature of the relationship between the child and the access 
parent was said to always be of importance, and the closer the relationship and the more 
dependent the child is on it for their emotional wellbeing and development, the more likely it 
would be that harm would occur to the child if the move went ahead. The court also placed 
importance on the reason for the move, the distance involved, and the child’s views.59 
Standniczenko was reaffirmed in D v S,60 where the Court of Appeal criticised the use of any 
kind of presumptions in New Zealand relocation law, and rejected the use of the Payne 
discipline.  
 
Following these decisions, the Care of Children Act 2004 was passed. Sections 4, 5, and 6 are 
broadly similar to the welfare checklist used in England and Wales. One particular point worth 
emphasising about the New Zealand legislation is that it places a heavy emphasis on parental 
cooperation,61 and continuity in the child’s upbringing.62 The impact of the new legislation was 
considered in detail in the New Zealand Supreme Court decision of Kacem v Bashir.63 At an 
earlier stage in proceedings, it was held that, due to the way in which the legislation was 
worded, the need to preserve the relationships between the child and both of their parents could 
                                                          
58 [1995] NZFLR 493. 
59 Ibid, 500. 
60 [2002] NZFLR 116. 
61 Section 5(c). 
62 Section 5(d) and (e). 
63 Kacem v Bashir [2010] NZSC 112.   
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take priority in relocation applications.64 This would effectively make relocation extremely 
difficult. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this, stating that one factor in the welfare 
assessment cannot either be elevated to a stand-alone principle, and or take priority over any 
others. The 2004 Act simply did not permit any priority among the factors outlined. Ultimately, 
there can be “no statutory presumption or policy pointing one way or the other”.65 Heneghan 
has argued that the consequences of the Supreme Court decision in Kacem are “uncertainty as 
to the result, and an element of lottery depending on the judge who decides the case.”66 In this 
context, having a list of factors to consider, such as statutory welfare checklists does not add 
much in terms of guidance for decision makers – without guidance as to weighting, different 
judges will emphasise different factors. For Heneghan, this is “not law; this is the application 
of personal preference”.67 He suggested instead a system that asks that we consider “the degree 
of actual responsibility taken for the child” by each parent,68 and give priority to the child’s 
emotional and physical safety, and to the child’s views. So long as safety is not an issue, the 
attitude of the applicant parent towards the other parent is given emphasis “because where 
parents work together, children inevitably benefit”.72 However, the current psychological state 
of the parents is not given particular emphasis.73 Heneghan does not argue that he is proposing 
a series of presumptions, but rather a “discipline” that would make decision-making more 
transparent while accommodating what social scientific literature tells us about the dynamics 
post-separation parenting.  
 
Relocation in Canada 
Canadian relocation law was originally based around what was described as a “presumptive 
deference” to primary care givers, due to the belief that the welfare of the child was 
“predominantly attached” to the welfare of their primary custodial parent.69 This was given its 
fullest expression in an Ontario decision which placed an evidential burden on the parent 
opposing relocation to demonstrate that the move was not in the child’s best interests, once the 
applicant custodial parent demonstrated that they were “acting responsibly.”70 The Supreme 
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Court of Canada ruled in Gordon v Goertz, however, that there could be no presumptions 
whatsoever, and that courts must take individualised determinations of the child’s best interests 
with no presumptions or special evidential burdens in favour or against either parent.71 In 
outlining how courts should make relocation decisions, Justice McLachlin stated that: 
The focus is on the best interests of the child, not the interests and rights of the parents. 
More particularly the judge should consider, inter alia: 
a. the existing custody arrangement and relationship between the child and the 
custodial parent; 
b. the existing access arrangement and the relationship between the child and the 
access parent; 
c. the desirability of maximizing contact between the child and both parents; 
d. the views of the child; 
e. the custodial parent's reason for moving, only in the exceptional case where it is 
relevant to that parent's ability to meet the needs of the child; 
f. disruption to the child of a change in custody; 
g. disruption to the child consequent on removal from family, schools, and the 
community he or she has come to know.72 
The provision at point (e) has proven to be controversial. According to Gordon, parental 
motivation is generally not relevant to the application, unless it is an exceptional case where 
the parent needs to move in order to meet the child’s needs. Barring “an improper motive 
reflecting adversely on the custodial parent's parenting ability”, the custodial parent’s motives 
for the move should not be scrutinised.73  
 
Research conducted for the Canadian Department of Justice has found, however, that “this 
direction is now generally disregarded by the lower courts, which regularly consider and assess 
the reasons for a proposed move.”74 Thompson has gone further and argued that, despite the 
Supreme Court’s ruling against presumptions, trial courts operated such a presumption in 
practice,75 rendering the Gordon approach “theoretically untenable and practically 
unworkable”.76 Further, Bala and Wheeler also support the idea that presumptions tend to 
operate in practice, noting the existence of two distinct sets of presumptions: a presumption in 
favour of relocation exists where the parent opposing relocation has perpetrated acts of familial 
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Separation/Divorce Parental Relocation (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2014) 23.  
75 Rollie Thompson, “Relocation and Relitigation: After Gordon v. Goertz” in Gerald P. Sadvari and Harold 
Niman, Family Law: “Best Interests of the Child” (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2001) 305.   
76 Ibid 296.   
15 
 
abuse, the parent seeking relocation has sole custody (legal or de facto), or the child wishes to 
move. They identify a presumption against relocation if the parent seeking relocation has made 
clearly unfounded allegations of familial abuse, there is shared physical custody (each parent 
has at least 40 per cent of the time), the parent seeking relocation has unilaterally moved the 
child, the child does not wish to move, the case is at an interim stage.77 In light of these 
criticisms, courts have also recognised that it may be time for the Supreme Court to revisit 
Gordon.78 
The operation of such presumptions clearly runs contrary to the spirit of Gordon. British 
Columbia has also introduced a statutory scheme which seeks to address some the problems 
that have resulted from the application of Gordon. The Family Law Act, SBC 2011 provides 
in s.37 that the court must only consider child’s best interests. It further provides in s.69 for a 
range of additional factors that must be taken into account in relocation cases, and mandates 
differential treatment of relocation cases based on prior custody arrangements. Where the 
parents do not have substantially equal parenting time with the child, the relocating guardian 
must satisfy the court that the proposed relocation is made in good faith, and that they have 
“proposed reasonable and workable arrangements to preserve the relationship between the 
child and the child's other guardians, persons who are entitled to contact with the child, and 
other persons who have a significant role in the child's life”.79 Where a court is satisfied of both 
of these criteria, “the relocation must be considered to be in the best interests of the child unless 
another guardian satisfies the court otherwise,”80 thereby producing a pro-relocation 
presumption. The relocating parent must prove both good faith and reasonable proposals prior 
to being able to avail of the presumption.81 
In cases where there is a substantially equal split in parenting time between both parents, 
however, the relocating parent must prove good faith, the presence of reasonable contact 
proposals, and that the move is in the child’s best interests,82 thereby successful applications in 
shared time cases significantly more difficult than in cases where there is a predominant 
primary carer. In determining the good faith of the relocating parent, the court must consider 
all relevant factors, including the reasons for the proposed relocation, whether the proposed 
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relocation is likely to enhance the general quality of life of the child and of the relocating 
parent, whether the relevant statutory notice of the application was given,83 and any restrictions 
on relocation contained in a written agreement or an order.84 The British Columbia model 
thereby provides an impetus to revise Gordon, although Bala et al note that the federal Supreme 
Court seems disinclined to do so.85 
 
Relocation in Australia 
The Australian courts do not see relocation cases as a separate category of dispute, but rather 
as ““parenting cases where the proposal of one of the parties involves relocation”.86 What this 
means in effect, is that the legislative rules relating to the best interests of the child found in 
s.60 of the Family Law Act 1975 govern such disputes. Several cases had attempted to set 
down some guidelines for how these cases ought to be determined, and the most comprehensive 
guidance is found in the decision of A v A: Relocation Approach, 87 where seven principles 
were outlined. The Full Court started by outlining two binding principles from AMS v AIF: the 
best interests of the child are the “paramount consideration, but not the sole consideration”, 
and a court cannot require the applicant to demonstrate “compelling reasons” for the 
relocation.88 The third principle is that the court must evaluate the competing proposals 
presented by the parties and weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of each for the child’s 
best interests. Fourthly, this should not be done in a way that separates the issue of relocation 
from that of residence.89 The fifth principle is that the evidence must be weighed as to how 
each proposal would hold advantages and disadvantages for the child’s best interests. It follows 
that, sixthly, the evaluation of the competing proposals is carried out by referring to the relevant 
sections of the Family Law Act that relate to the best interests of the child.90 Finally, the Court 
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held that “the object and principles of s60B provide guidance to a court’s obligation to consider 
the matters in s68F(2) that arise in the context of the particular case”.91  
Having outlined the seven guiding principles, the Court set out a three-step summary of the 
correct approach to determining a parenting case that involves a proposal to relocate the 
residence of a child.92 The first step is to identify the relevant competing proposals for future 
care of the child. The second step is to explain the advantages and disadvantages of each 
proposal by examining the factors set out in the legislation. One relevant factor to be weighed 
will be the “reasons for relocation as they bear upon the child’s best interests”.93 This must be 
weighed against other factors. The third step is to explain why one proposal is to be preferred, 
having regard to the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration, but not the sole 
consideration. No single factor should determine which proposal is to be preferred. As part of 
this process, it was held that regard must be had to the following issues: none of the parties 
bears any special kind of evidential onus,94 the importance of a party’s constitutional right to 
freedom of movement, and finally, matters of weight should be explained – in other words, the 
court must indicate which of the relevant matters were of greater significance and how the 
matters balance out.95  
The decision in A v A was made prior to a major series of reforms passed in 2006 aimed at 
promoting shared parenting in Australia.96 The 2006 Act divided children’s interests into 
primary and additional considerations, with the benefit of the child having a meaningful 
relationship with both parents being among the primary considerations.97 It also recast the 
objects and principles provisions of the legislation. One of the objects is to ensure that a child 
has the benefit of both of the child's parents having a meaningful involvement in the child's 
life, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child.98 While the case law 
on relocation since the introduction of these reforms has not altered the approach outlined in A 
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v A, Parkinson notes that the number of successful relocation applications has declined since 
the introduction of the 2006 Act.99 
Presumptions, guidelines, and asking the right questions: How to approach relocation 
decisions 
The brief outline of how relocation is handled in the jurisdictions mentioned above 
demonstrates a number of salient features – all jurisdictions have a statutory akin to a welfare 
checklist, and that in the majority of cases, courts have seen fit to provide additional guidance 
on how to weigh those factors in relocation disputes. Further, virtually all experts on the subject 
regard unfettered or pure best interests approaches to be harmful in the relocation context. They 
also accept that the operation of de facto presumptions can creep in despite legislative and 
judicial statements to the contrary. It is essential that the Irish courts consider how to apply the 
new s.31 criteria in light of international experience. If this is not done, it is likely that the 
matter kind of criticisms levelled at the law in New Zealand and Canada will inevitably follow 
here, leading either to the use of judicial personal preference, or the introduction of 
presumptions via the back door. But this introduces a very important question – can 
presumptions of some kind ever be justifiable while retaining the overarching emphasis on a 
child’s best interests? 
 
Thompson has argued that presumptions not only do exist in Canadian relocation law, but that 
their use should be embraced. He argues that merely directing trial courts to ask a series of 
questions is telling such courts to do what they are doing anyway, and that in any event, this 
approach has been a failure.100 While any decision must be in the child’s best interests, 
relocation research can tell us certain things about how different kinds of relocation application 
are likely to impact on a child. Presumptions, therefore, are to be used as starting points in the 
best interests analysis. A presumption for or against relocation would, he recognises, be far too 
crude to be of any value and would not respect the child’s interests. He proposes four 
presumptions that should be built into the best interests framework -   
 where the relocating parent seeks to move in the interim, pending a full hearing, there 
should be a presumption against relocation, with some scope for rebuttal;  
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 where the relocating parent has moved or has attempted to move, unilaterally or 
surreptitiously or without notice, there should be a presumption that the relocation is 
not in the best interests of the child, unless the contrary is proved;  
 where the parents substantially share the care of a child, there should be a presumption 
that the relocation is not in the best interests of the child, unless the contrary is proved. 
 Where the relocating parent is the predominant primary caregiver, there should be a 
presumption that the relocation is in the best interests of the child, unless the contrary 
is proved.101  
 
Thomspon specifically categorises these presumptions as “weak”, capable of being displaced 
by evidence to the contrary. For example, in cases there is a history of family violence, that 
history alone would be sufficient to displace a presumption against a move.102 Additionally, he 
reasons, there will always a be percentage of cases which do not fall within the categories he 
outlines; in such cases, it will be necessary to lapse back onto the traditional best interests 
approach. Many of these, he predicts, will involve cases where both parents are active in the 
child’s life and where it cannot be said that there is either shared care or a predominant primary 
carer. Ultimately, he posits that presumptions will give greater guidance to litigants and lawyers 
at an earlier stage in proceedings, encouraging them to arrive at practical, and workable contact 
arrangements via negotiation or mediation.103  
Introducing presumptions would involve a quite radical rethink of how we reconcile their use 
with the judicial preference for individualised decision making in children’s cases, especially 
now that Ireland has given the best interests principle a constitutional status. Alternative reform 
models predicated on providing a clearer structure for relocation judgments have also been 
proposed. Parkinson and Cashmore recognise that the financial cost of litigating in a high-
conflict, high-stress context itself causes further negative outcomes for children,104 but argue 
that the use of presumptions would do more harm than good.105 Presumptions can make the 
mistake of aligning a child’s interest with those of their carers,106 and that the overall emphasis 
on children’s best interest demands reality testing of proposals, rather than presumptions that 
may colour the outcome of that testing.107 They similarly criticise a broad understanding of 
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what a welfare or best interests based approach would entail, leading them to argue “…for 
guided decision making, not unbridled discretion.”108 While they acknowledge the role that 
such checklists can play, they are insufficient in relocation disputes. In order to promote quality 
decision making, Parkinson and Cashmore advocate that courts should ask three questions:  
First, how close is the relationship between the non-resident parent and the child and 
how important is that relationship developmentally to the child? Second, if the 
relocation is to be permitted, how viable are the proposals for contact with the 
nonresident parent? Third, if the relationship between the child and the nonresident 
parent is developmentally important to the child and is likely to be diminished if the 
move is allowed, then (a) what are the viable alternatives to the parents living a long 
distance apart? and (b) is a move with the primary caregiver the least detrimental 
alternative? 
Such an approach, they argue, would allow the consideration of options such as the relocation 
of the non-resident parent to the same location as the child and resident parent, if feasible, while 
also considering the quality of the relationship between the child and the non-resident parent 
to be a significant factor in the court’s decision – non-resident parents with little and sporadic 
contact with the child would not be a position to prevent a legitimate move. They later accepted 
that there is some merit in Thompson’s position, particularly over the importance of notice 
requirements and presumptions against unilateral relocation.109 They also recognise that 
differentiation between family circumstances based on general indicators such as care history 
or family violence is important.110 They also conclude that the first of their questions may be 
difficult to answer in the absence of an expert, often court-funded, report into the family’s care 
dynamics.111 
Further support for a form of structured guidance is found in Rob George’s work. He highlights 
the desire among practitioners engaged in relocation litigation for judicial guidance.112 He 
convincingly criticises presumptions in the relocation context as confusing predictions of 
future outcomes with facts from which a presumption may be readily drawn, and as obscuring 
the complex and differing realities that can underpin cases which may attract broadly similar 
labels.113 Like Parkinson and Cashmore, he proposes that guidance be provided through a series 
of questions: Courts should first ask how are the care-giving responsibilities for the child (and 
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other family members, if relevant) currently being discharged? Secondly, why does the 
applicant parent wish to relocate, and why is the application being opposed? Thirdly, what 
scope is there for either parent to change their plans so that the child can remain in close 
proximity to both and what effect such a course of action would have on the parents and on the 
child. Fourthly, if the applicant is going to relocate and the respondent is not, what would be 
the likely effect on the child either of relocating or of remaining in the current location with 
the respondent instead? Finally, what are the wishes and feelings of each child involved?114  
Would the incorporation of structured questioning as outlined in these models be acceptable in 
the Irish context? They could be criticised as introducing a judicial gloss on the statute. This is 
not necessarily the case. Guidelines for the questions trial judges should ask, such as those 
proposed by Parkinson, Cashmore and George  would be a minimalist intervention by appellate 
courts with the aim of providing greater predictability as to how the statutory criteria will be 
interpreted without going so far as to introduce presumptions. They still permit individualised 
decisions and they give some guidance on how important the various criteria (such as 
maintenance of meaningful relationships) are in relocation context, thereby allowing clearly 
unmeritorious arguments or unrealistic proposals by either parent to be filtered out of 
proceedings at an early stage while retaining the integrity of the statute and allowing a court to 
fulfil its constitutional obligations to children’s welfare.  
Conclusion 
This article has a reasonably limited ambition. Like Thompon’s article, it is designed to start a 
conversation about how relocation disputes now ought to be handled. The presence of a new 
constitutional and legislative framework, coupled with international experience of the 
problems relocation presents, demand that a workable solution is found for the Irish courts. 
Present guidance is inadequate – much of the Irish case law predates the current legislation, 
and the post-2015 case law shows a troubling inclination to accommodate irrelevant factors. 
What does seem clear is that the constitutional position both under Art 40.3 and Art 42A.4 is 
that the welfare of the child must remain the paramount consideration, but does this mean that 
there can be no room for presumptions in Irish law, even if couched in terms of the “weak” 
presumptions argued for by Thompson? It would seem that the decisions to date stand against 
the use of such an evidential tool, and so recourse must be had to the use of structured, weighted 
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guidance that avoids the pitfalls of a simple application of the statutory factors. While many of 
Thompson’s presumptions have merit, it may be that the constitutional constraints on judging 
will likely require that  structured guidance be utilised in future decisions. However, a defence 
of presumptions in the new legal context would be a welcome addition to conversation. 
 
 
 
 
